The Pir Panjal Challenge
By: Kanchan Basu
The Indian Army is not used to persistent negative encounters that upset its tremendous track record in counter-terrorist operations. It does not claim continuous success either, as negative encounters did occur in the past intermittently – although mostly after long intervals.
That was when the strength of terrorists was high, intelligence less reliable, and even speculative search and destroy operations were productive in contacts. The recent run of encounters in the depth areas of the Poonch-Rajouri sector have resulted in more losses for the Army than the terrorists, in an environment in which the strength of terrorists is much diluted, but better technologies are available.
In addition, while the Kashmir zone – the traditionally more volatile area — is relatively quiet, it’s the Pir Panjal (South) in the Jammu sector which has, in December 2023, witnessed more operational activity and presence of terrorists.
Why has terrorist presence and activity shifted to the Poonch-Rajouri sector? The answer is clear. Terrorism is like water; it takes the path of least resistance. Kashmir is too hot for Pakistan to make a strong statement on its “relevance” and “capability to calibrate” –both issues that are important to Pakistan’s doctrine of proxy hybrid war.
Kashmir’s strong and layered counter-infiltration (CI) and counter-terrorism (CT) grid makes plan- ning of proxy operations difficult. The Poonch-Rajouri sector has had a chequered history of local support, which enabled Pakistan to establish a strong proxy presence in the forested and rocky tracts of the Pir Panjal (South).
Although this waned over time, perhaps some clandestine efforts to re-cultivate the population have occurred in recent years, with some reported antipathy among the Gujjar community. However, there is only speculative evidence of this. The abrogation of ‘Article 370’ has also made Kashmir less conducive to separatist trends.
Secondly, is there any truth that the Indian Army’s redeployment of some formations from this sector has led to the dilution of optimum deployment? From May 2020 on- wards when the Ladakh sector was activated, some troops were lifted from the Jammu sector and redeployed there.
There may have been some dilution, but HQ Northern Command has always been watchful of this and has followed the basic principle of re- deploying and creating other reserves. In any case, the Rashtriya Rifles troops from the Poonch-Rajouri sector were never disturbed. Yet, when adversary focus comes on a sub- sector, some redeployment for a stronger grid, especially the presence of uncommitted response elements, must be arranged. Some of this has already been done, a little more could follow.
Has the Indian Army encountered anything similar in the past? If so, how did it deal with it? In the Valley on 1999-2001, provides an answer. The move of the Indian Army’s 8 Mountain Division from North Kashmir to Kargil in June 1999 opened up wide spaces for the entry of terrorists from across an unfenced Line of Control (LoC).
They adopted the tactics of suicide attacks on Indian Army and Police camps. It was rumoured that some Pakistan Army elements were providing the field leadership. There were big contacts and raging battles with the Indian Army for the better part of the next 18 months or so.
Redeployment did take place and the Kilo Force was created to take charge. I do not think tactical or operational space has been lost in Poonch-Rajouri and the overall capability of Pakistan to sustain any success is still limited. Besides, the Indian government’s demonstrated capability for retaliation when an undetermined threshold is crossed will keep Pakistan on tenterhooks.
So, is this about drills, (Standard Operation Procedure) SOPs and minor tactics? Does the Indian Army accept the need for a review of some identified weaknesses – for example, the inevitable aspect of convoy security, hardening of operational vehicles, enhancing the size of movement of reinforcements, etc?
I recall 2007-08 when there were several ambushes in the Valley from maize fields which terrorists stopped from being harvested. Indian Army reviewed all movements SOPs and response drills with special emphasis on the first two minutes of contact when most casualties occur.
The Indian Army is an organisation adept at self-learning. It only needs reminders of legacy events and the methods that are available in-house. I think brigade-sized operations to be conducted in the lower reaches of the Pir Panjal with drone support, as the foliage cover is lowest at this time. This needs to be reinforced by a strong public outreach, as done in the Valley.
(The author is based in Kolkata)
