Need to work out a peace plan
By: Kanchan Basu
The Chief Minister of Chhattisgarh, Bhupesh Baghel, while meeting the people announced that the State government was ready for peace talks with the Maoists provided they laid down arms and expressed their faith in the Constitution of India.
Some conditions
In this response, through its spokesperson (pseudonym, Vikalp), the Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee (DKSZC) of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) alleged (in a pamphlet issued on May 5, 2022) that the offer was dodgy and wanted the Chief Minister to clarify his stand on the CPI (Maoist)’s conditions for creating a conducive atmosphere in which to hold peace talks.
The spokesperson also made other accusations and criticized the State government for not implementing the PESA or Provisions of Panchayats (Extension to the Sheduled Areas) Act, 1996 in Chhattisgarh. The major conditions the Maoists want include: a lifting of the ban on their party, the People’s Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA) and people’s organizations; withdrawal of security forces from camps, and the release of jailed leaders in order to participate in the talks. As the State government did not change its earlier stand, there has been no progress.
In 2010, then Home Minister P. Chidambaram, tried to bring the Maoists to the negotiating table, with the line, “If you call a halt to violence, we are prepared to talk to you.” In response Azad, alias Cherukuri Rajkumar (now deceased), a Central Politburo Member and Spokesperson of the Central Committee, CPI (Maoist) clarified that the condition of ‘withdrawal of all-out war’ (as the first condition) was nothing but a cessation of hostilities by both sides simultaneously, i.e., mutual ceasefire and not unilateral ceasefire by the CPI (Maoist). Second, for peaceful legal work by the CPI (Maoist), lifting of the ban on the party (the second condition) was necessary.
The third condition was that the government should adhere to the Constitution and end the ‘illegal murders’ in the name of ‘encounters, tortures and arrests’. In order to hold talks, it was necessary for the government to release some leaders (also a part of the third condition) or else, there would be no one to talk to since the entire party was illegal.
The stand by Ganapathi (then Party General Secretary) on talks with the government was also published in the CPI (Maoist) magazine, ‘People’s March’. Swami Agnivesh (now deceased), the social activist and peace person between the government of India and the CPI (Maoist), forwarded Mr. Chidambaram’s letter of May 11, 2010 (addressed to Swami Agnivesh) to Azad which specifically mentioned the CPI (Maoist) promise ‘No Violence For 72 Hours’ to initiate talks. Azad responded to Swami Agnivesh (May 31, 2010) and reiterated the party’s stand. However, Azad was killed in an encounter with the ‘Greyhound Commando’ force of the Andhra Pradesh police on July 2, 2010 and the process of trust building derailed.
Why talks failed
In the State Assembly election campaign in 2004, the Congress party promised to revive the ‘Peace Process’ (that had broken down during Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister N. Chandrababu’s regime) if voted to power in Andhra Pradesh.
To initiate talks, the State government lifted the ban on the party in May 2004. Consequently, there was four-day peace dialogue in October 2004 between the representatives of the People’s War (PW) party and government representatives at the initiative of the Committee of Concerned Citizens.
A mutually acceptable team of mediators (led by former civil servant S. R. Sankaran) was constituted and an agreement on a ceasefire (Eight clauses) was reached. The PW party (which had merged with the Maoist Communist Centre of India, and other splinter Maoist groups in September 2004 to from the CPI (Maoist), proposed an 11-point charter of demands such as legislation on land ceiling; creation of a separate state of Telangana; and questions associated with armed action by either side. Matters of land reform figured prominently in the discussions. While the State representatives raised the issue of laying down arms, this was not the agreed agenda and the issue was held in reserve for the second round of talks.
‘Clause 7’ (of the Cease Fire Agreement) which permitted the Maoists to undertake propagation of their politics without carrying weapons, had become problematic. Though the Maoists at the peace talks had handed over their weapons to their cadres while leaving the jungles, media pictures of activity by their armed squads made the police uneasy. The talks ended with an agreement on a ceasefire till December 16, the government to consider the main demand of land distribution among the landless, and talks again in November. Later, the Chief Minister declared that there would be no talks with the Maoists unless they agreed to lay down arms.
The Andhra Pradesh Home Minister leveled allegations against the Naxalites about extortion for their meetings and construction of their memorials. Thus the ‘Peace Process’ collapsed midway and the ban was re-imposed on the CPI (Maoist) and its sister organizations.
Using this background, it can be reasonably implied that the Maoist’s demand of withdrawal of armed police forces can be met by a mutually agreed ‘Ceasefire’, with its limited meaning of abjuring violence by the Maoists and the halting of anti-Maoist operations by security forces for some period. The State government cannot afford the risk moving out security forces as a pre-condition for initiating peace talks.
When contesting the elections in 2018, the Congress promised to do something about the thousands of innocent villagers who are arrested en masse by the police as suspected Maoists and spend long years in jail before being acquitted. For these villagers, meeting their families is difficult and hiring lawyers drains their meager resources. Even as a few dedicated human rights lawyers have tried to help, the scale of arrests is huge. Yet, the government’s resolve in freeing prisoners – even during COVID-19.
Government actions
Second, the release of jailed Maoist leaders need not be made a pre-condition by the Maoists, as most senior Maoist leaders are at large; there is no senior cadre in Chhattisgarh’s jails. Moreover, the Chhattisgarh government has not only withdrawn criminal cases against many tribal but has also ensured expeditious trial of Naxal cases. The government is also hard at work to implement PESA (Panchayat Extension of Schedule Area) Act.
However, with regard to the third condition, of withdrawing a ban on the CPI (Maoist), the PLGA (People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army) and its front organizations, some concessions may be thought of to let the talks happen. Further, it cannot be denied that the Maoists misused the ceasefire during the 2004 peace talks in Andhra Pradesh; Azad admitted in the interview, “We used it to talk our politics widely among the people in the State and outside.”
On April 4, 2023, Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Bhupesh Baghel announced that his government would facilitate the return of displaced Adivasis. Baghel had just met with the New Peace Process delegation and assured them that he would create a conducive environment for their return.
“Those who had to migrate from Sukma, Bijapur and Dantewada districts of Chhattisgarh during the Salwa Judum, and want to come back now will be provided with all kinds of facilities, including ration shop, school, employment, along with land for agriculture,” a press release from Chief Minister’s of Chhattisgarh office read.
In May 2023, the Chhattisgarh government conducted a survey of displaced Adivasis in Telangana and Andhra Pradesh to poll whether they wanted to return or not. Haris S, the district collector of Sukma, told that five teams were sent to both states to cover around 85 villages.
“They spoke to around 9,700 villagers. Only eight or nine said they want to come back,” he said. “We prepared a report based on the survey and sent it to higher authorities in June.” He said they’re still waiting to hear back on the next course of action.
“What is different between the situation earlier and the situation now is that we have now surrounded the Maoists and are fighting them. Earlier, attacks took place on camps (of security personnel). Now we are entering their strongholds, surrounding them and striking them. But in such encounters, there are losses on both sides,” Bhupesh Baghel said.
Elaborating on what has changed now, Baghel said, “Earlier, the villagers, especially in Bastar, had lost faith in the government. They were losing their land, even water bodies were captured. They felt they were not getting the right price for their produce. They felt deprived of education, other welfare measures. On the other hand, security personnel thought that anyone outside their camp was a Maoist.”
“There was a trust deficit. The biggest change is that we tried to win their (villagers’) trust,” Baghel added.
The Chief Minister, Bhupesh Baghel then detailed his government’s steps to reach out to villagers, including an exercise to return land to tribal’s. “We have given 18 lakh hectares to villagers. This is unprecedented. This has not happened anywhere in the country,” he said.
Bhupesh Baghel also detailed how his government’s steps how helped millet farmers and the ‘Mahua Industry.’ Mahua refers to a flower used to make an alcoholic beverage.
Therefore, moving forward with the lessons learned, suitable modalities may be worked out if both sides are serious about peace talks.
